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Extending Economic Boundaries and Exporting Expertise: 
New Evidence on Singapore’s Gambit in Indonesia, Vietnam and India 
 
Abstract: Singapore’s regionalization stratagem led to the establishment of industrial parks in China, India and several 
South-East Asian countries. The strategic intent behind these overseas projects was two-fold: exporting Singapore’s 
competencies such as management know-how, technological capabilities and corrupt-free administration to regions 
where such positive factors were lacking and secondly, exploiting comparative advantages that each region had to offer. 
This paper1 revisits Singapore’s flagship projects in Indonesia, Vietnam and India. Evidence from on-site surveys 
and interviews are presented. This paper contends that progress in these privileged investment zones remains 
stymied by particular dependencies and challenges in the host environments. 
 
Key Words:  Regionalization – Trans-border Industrialization – Singapore’s Overseas Industrial Parks 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last four decades, Singapore, a city-state, has risen to be Southeast Asia’s premier world-city, as well as an 
important base for multinational manufacturing. Singapore’s reputation for corrupt-free administration and 
infrastructural efficiency, coupled with overall integrity of its legal and financial systems, have played a central role 
in attracting foreign direct investments to fuel the city-state’s economic development (Pang, 1987; Perry, 1995; 
Yeung, 2001). However, rising business costs – in the late 1970s and early 1980s – rendered it an imperative for 
Singapore’s economic planners to expand the island's investment horizons2 and potential economic growth through 
an overseas direct investment program3. Singapore-based companies were goaded to form joint ventures with 
companies in North America and Europe, to accelerate access to new technology and foreign markets (Caplen and 
Ng, 1990; Balakrishnan, 1991; Wong and Ng, 1991). However, most of these investments proved unsuccessful, 
resulting in enormous losses by the early 1990s (Kanai, 1993; Regnier, 1993; Murray and Pereira, 1995). 
 
A new phase in the internationalization strategy re-focused on expansion within Asia. The strategic repositioning 
was deliberated at the 1993 Regionalization Forum (Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB), 1993a), and 
encapsulated in the policy document, Singapore Unlimited (SEDB, 1995a; 1995b). This stratagem was endorsed by 
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the Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas (Singapore Ministry of Finance, 1993). The change from 
internationalization (or, in local parlance, outer globalization) to regionalization (inner globalization) was 
rationalized by the liberalization of foreign investment controls occurring at the time in countries like Indonesia, 
China and Vietnam, and the high growth rates these economies were achieving (SEDB, 1993b; 1993c; Lee, 1994; 
Mahizhnan, 1994; Pang 1995; Kwok, 1995; Tan, 1995; Okposin, 1999; Pereira, 2001; Blomqvist, 2002; Sitathan, 
2002).  
 
Singapore’s trans-border industrialization initiatives comprised state-led4 infrastructure projects, and a range of 
incentives and regulatory innovations (Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998; Goh, et al, 2001; Yeung, 2001), designed to create 
Singapore-styled industrial townships in regional sites where such positive factors may be lacking (Perry and Yeoh, 
2000). A three-pronged ‘Singapore Inc’ approach was adopted (Yeoh, et al, 2004a). Senior politicians and civil 
servants negotiated 5  the institutional framework for the project, which typically involved garnering special 
investment conditions in the host location; (Singapore) government agencies and government-linked companies 
(GLCs) took the lead in infrastructure development; and Singapore’s Economic Development Board took on the role 
of ‘business architect’ and ‘knowledge arbitrageur’ (SEDB, 1995a:42), by encouraging foreign multinationals to 
locate their regional headquarters in Singapore, whilst redistributing their lower-end operations to the Singapore-
styled industrial parks.  
 
This strategic maneuver was premised on the perception that the redistribution of economic activities to regional 
industrial sites would enhance the collective competitiveness (or shakkei6) of Singapore-based companies, as well as 
Singapore’s own competitiveness as a high-value investment location with strategic linkages to the region. The 
strategic intent was for Singapore-based companies to tap into the markets, and resources, of regional economies. It 
was also intended to strengthen Singapore’s MNC-linkages through co-investment in the region (SEDB 1993a; 
1993b; 1995a; 1995b); thus these industrial townships were located in key areas of high economic growth in various 
countries in the region. The most well-known of these, the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CSSIP), and its 
effects on both Singapore and the Suzhou region are well-documented7 (Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative 
Committee, 1999; Pan, et al, 2000; Pereira, 2003); less so, however, are the effects of its lesser-known cousins. 
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This paper will focus, specifically, on Singapore’s lesser-known industrial township projects, in Batam Island 
(Indonesia), Ho Chi Minh City (Vietnam), and the most recent project, in Bangalore, India’s IT capital. To provide 
context to the discussion, the theoretical considerations underpinning these flagship projects are discussed in the 
next section, followed by an account of the origins and progress of the case study parks. Two core issues in the 
paper – the attractiveness of these industrial parks to their tenants and the future challenges faced by the owners and 
management of these parks – will then be sequentially examined. 
 
In the first issue, we determine the flagship projects’ progress in attracting investment, the contributions to the 
strategic objectives associated with the park, as well as to Singapore’s broader regionalization initiative. The 
analysis is reinforced by our on-site surveys of the decisions by firms to invest in the three parks. Following from 
the investment decisions, we examine the current challenges faced by the parks’ tenants, to determine whether the 
current owners and management had followed up with the second phase of the project, which is to encourage more 
firms to locate in the parks while satisfying the needs of the parks’ current tenants. In-depth case studies of selected 
tenants in all three locations further substantiate our findings.  
 
The paper then incorporates these findings with the underlying macro environment (in terms of heightened 
competition and political ‘patronage’), thereby leading to a comprehensive examination of the second issue - the 
future challenges faced by the owners and management of these parks. We conclude our findings by considering the 
implications of these experiences for Singapore’s regionalization program, and evaluating the city-state’s 
determined efforts to harness synergistic complementarities in its strategic intent to restructure the Singapore 
economy. 
 
2. THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Prior to the 1960s, attempts to explain the activities of firms situated beyond their national boundaries represented 
an amalgamation of (i) the theory of (portfolio) capital movements (ii) empirical and largely country-specific studies 
on location factors influencing foreign direct investment (iii) modification to the neo-classical theories of trade, (iv) 
perceived gains of vertical or horizontal integration. Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (1980, 1988, 2001) sought to offer 
a general framework for determining the extent and activities of MNE engaged in cross-border value-adding 
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activities. The eclectic paradigm was used to explain the ability and willingness of firms to serve markets, and to 
look into the reasons for their choice of exploiting this advantage through foreign production rather than domestic 
production, exports or portfolio resource flows through the interaction of ownership-specific advantages, 
internalization-incentive advantages, and location-specific advantages (OLI). This theory has been extended, in 
more recent literature, to deliberations on the role of infrastructure in the attraction of new investments (Peck, 1996); 
the presence of immobile clusters of complementary value-added activities (Markusen, 1996), the transactional 
benefits of spatial proximity (Porter, 1996) and the business-government nexus in alliance capitalism (Dunning 1995, 
1997; Evans, 1995; Dunning and Narula, 1996, 2000). 
 
Not all advantages provided by the triumvirate of OLI will be evenly distributed across enterprises, industries and 
countries. These advantages are not static and may affect a firm’s strategic response to any particular OLI 
configuration. Firms excogitate the O advantages through exploitation of firm-specific resources, simultaneously 
deriving I advantages through the diminution of transaction costs. As firms’ core competencies become increasingly 
knowledge-intensive, MNEs seek locations (economic and institutional facilities) that are best utilizing their core 
competencies. In determining the propitious extent in which a firm strategically locates, we will examine, inter alia, 
Singapore’s trans-border industrialization efforts, with particular focus on the regionalization of Singapore-based 
firms, and if the locations of these townships are indeed that strategically advantageous.  
 
Theories, from the perspective of the firm, have further argued that not only should the production process be 
viewed as a value chain (Kogut, 1985; Porter, 1986, 1994, 1996), but also, firms should identify comparative or 
location-specific advantages unique to each country/territory, which will serve to complement the competitive 
advantage they enjoy as a result of being placed higher up in the value chain. Additionally, in the face of 
globalization, the location-specific advantages need to be altered to suit the increasing spatial integration of complex 
and rapidly changing economic activities and to also consider the role of national and regional authorities in their 
influence over the extent and structure of localized centers of excellence. Thus, a holistic approach must be adopted 
that takes into consideration firm-oriented competitive advantages as well as comparative advantages offered by 
regions. Synergistic efforts will occur when a strategic fit between the competitive and comparative advantages exist. 
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Before we take up the discussion on our empirical findings, a sketch of the case-study parks is presented in the next 
section. 
 
3. SINGAPORE’S OVERSEAS INDUSTRIAL PARKS 
Batamindo Industrial Park (BIP), Indonesia 
The late 1960s witnessed Indonesia’s ambition to develop the Riau islands when Batam was identified as a potential 
logistics and operational base to support offshore oil and gas fields. The first master plan for Batam was 
commissioned by the Indonesian state-owned oil company, Pertamina, to develop the island into a base for oil and 
gas exploration activities. The original master plan was reviewed in 1977 with recommendations for a more broad-
based development of the island. A significant step in the island’s development was the assignment of Batam’s 
development responsibility to the Batam Industrial Development Authority (BIDA) in 1978. The then BIDA’s 
chairman, B.J. Habibie, favored attempts to engineer accelerated technological breakthroughs based on state-
directed investment. This was reflected in the 1979 master plan, which focused on the development of transhipment 
facilities, the establishment of industrial estates, the development of marshalling areas for imports and exports, the 
construction of tourist facilities and the provision of infrastructural support. This master plan recognized that the 
Riau islands with its location-specific advantages such as abundant land and cheap labor were well-positioned8 to 
address Singapore’s land and labor constraints and, more importantly, to take advantage of Singapore's established 
business and financial services network and the city-state's efficient facilities for communication, transportation and 
other services (Liew, 1990; Yeoh, 1990; Ng and Wong, 1991; Regnier, 1991; Perry, 1991; Parsonage, 1992; Ho, 
1994). A Memorandum of Understanding on bilateral cooperation in the development of Riau Province was signed 
on August 29, 1990. 
 
BIP was launched in 1992. The Park started as a joint-venture between Singapore’s GLCs9 and the Salim Group of 
Indonesia. Salim was Indonesia’s largest business conglomerate, and had close links to senior politicians and 
privileged access to the major investment projects in the Riau Islands (Sato, 1993; Hill, 1996). Singaporean GLCs 
were given control over the development and management of the Parks, while Salim’s role was to facilitate 
operations and to provide a guarantee of priority over regulatory controls and administrative approvals. Singapore’s 
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reputation for transparent and efficient management of projects lent further credibility to the projects and maximized 
marketing leverage over Singapore-based multinationals (Yeoh, et al; 1992; Naidu, 1994). 
 
BIP was envisaged as a self-contained environment with its communication and business linkages through 
Singapore rather than through Indonesia. BIP, for instance, has its own power supply, water treatment plant, 
sewerage system, telecommunications facilities and social amenities. These, together with the location advantages 
that Indonesia offers, has resulted in an investment enclave offering facilities close to conditions in Singapore, in 
marked contrast to the conditions immediate outside the Parks.  
 
BIP’s first tenants were mainly subsidiaries of American, European, and Japanese multinationals already operating 
in Singapore. Cumulative investments and export value in BIP topped US$1billion and US$2 billion in 2002 
respectively, and the number of confirmed tenants increased from 17 in 1991 to 82 in 2003. Of these, 39 were 
Japanese companies with Singapore-owned companies the next largest concentration at 25. American and European 
investors have a limited presence. There is a concentration of electronics operations, mainly various component 
assembly processes, and supporting activities to the electronics sector such as plastic moulding and packaging. Out 
of total employment of 65,000, over 85% are female, most aged from 18-22. Table 1A sets out BIP’s operational 
statistics, while Table 1B shows the tenant profile by country of origin and Table 1C, the tenant profile by sector. 
 
Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park (VSIP) 
VSIP is Singapore’s flagship investment in Vietnam. The plan was first mooted in March 1994 by the then 
Vietnamese Prime Minister, Vo Van Kiet, and Singapore’s Prime Minister, Goh Chok Tong. VSIP was launched in 
1996. The 1,000-hectare Park is located in Binh Duong Province, 17 km north of Ho Chi Minh City, and is within a 
40-minute drive from the international airport and seaports. A self-contained, self-sufficient industrial park with 
prepared land plots, and ready-built factories, bolstered by Singapore-style management expertise and infrastructure 
support, VSIP provides a ‘hassle-free’, one-stop service to its tenants. VSIP boasts an on-site customs unit, which 
allows the convenience of customs procedures and documentation to be done within the Park, and customs 
inspections within tenant’s factories. A 200,000 working population within a 15-km radius from VSIP provides a 
ready pool of low-cost, skilled labor (VSIP Connection, various issues). Training is largely provided by the S$9.5 
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million Vietnam-Singapore Technical Training Centre (VSTTC) established in 1998. VSTTC is a three-way project 
between the Singapore and Vietnam governments, and VSIP.  
 
In VSIP, Singapore applied lessons learned from its China experience and made deliberate efforts to foster strong 
collaboration with local authorities. A Management Board10 was set up, chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Binh 
Duong Province People's Committee, which pre-empted the perception that VSIP was a partnership forced upon by 
the central government. The SembCorp Industries-led consortium11 holds a 51-percent stake. The Vietnamese 
partner is Becamex, a state-owned enterprise. 
 
VSIP’s early tenants included 3M, Sandoz, Sakata Inc, Godrej (India), Liwayway Food Industries (Philippines), and 
a mix of Singapore manufacturers like ST Automotive, Star Chemicals and Hwa Hup. The role of Singapore’s EDB 
has been acknowledged. VSIP had, by November 1998, attracted US$370 million in investments and thirty investors 
from ten different countries investing in a broad swathe of industries: food, electrical and electronics, 
pharmaceuticals and healthcare, specialty materials, consumer goods and light industries. Investment commitments 
in VSIP are currently valued at over US$600 million from 124 tenants, of which 80 are already operational (Table 
2A).  Thus far, 24,000 jobs have been created, with the number expected to rise to 40,000 when the remainder of the 
tenants start their operation. Phases 1 and 2 have been fully taken up, with another 200 hectares left to be developed 
as part of phase three. This is expected to start in 2004.  
 
VSIP has a list of ‘priority’ industries, which adheres closely to the official list of preferred industries12. Unlike BIP, 
where the focus on electronics complements Singapore’s economic development, VSIP holds no such objective. It is 
less selective of target industries. The tenant mix reflects the importance of Asian MNCs, while the sector mix 
ranges from textiles, to electronics and pharmaceuticals (Tables 2B and 2C). Among the tenants, Singaporean and 
non-Asian firms come from diverse industries, while Japanese firms which locate in VSIP are more likely to be 
manufacturers of electronics and other parts and components. VSIP posted its first profits of US$4million in 2002. 
 
International Tech Park Limited (ITPL), India 
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The idea to create a Singapore-styled park was first mooted by Singapore’s Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and 
India’s Premier, P.V. Narasimha Rao, in 1992. Construction commenced in September 1994, and the park was 
officially inaugurated in 2000. ITPL is located 18km away from Bangalore in India’s Silicon Valley13. The partners 
in the ITPL project are a Singapore consortium of companies14 led by Ascendas International, the Tata Group and 
the Karnataka state government in a 40-40-20 arrangement. The Karnataka state government has since reduced its 
stake to 6 percent, while the Singapore consortium, and the Tata Group have increased their respective stakes to 47 
percent each. 
 
Marketed aggressively as an environment that ‘cuts through the red tape and bottlenecks that are a part of India’s 
infrastructure and operating environment’ 15 , ITPL was slated to provide total business space solutions to 
multinationals and other conglomerates, within a state-of-the-art technology park. More distinctively, ITPL 
guarantees uninterrupted power supply and telecommunication facilities, immediate-occupancy business incubator 
space, and the formulaic ‘one-stop’ service. Its futuristic design comes complete with value added services like 
business/office support centers, medical center, food court, restaurants, and recreational centers. ITPL also houses 
the Indian Institute of Information Technology, which provides professional and skilled manpower for the Park’s 
tenants. Operating profits have been registered, and ITPL is projected to break even within the next 4 years.     
 
The blend of location-specific advantages such as technology and infrastructure on one hand, and competitive 
skilled labor on the other led to high value added activities taking place at ITPL. ITPL’s earliest clients included 
SAP Labs, First Ring and 24/7. As at January 2003, there are 100 confirmed tenants, of which 93 are operational 
with 8500 employees (Table 3A). More than half of these tenants are represented by wholly or partially foreign-
owned firms which include some well known global players like AT&T, IBM, Motorola, Sony, Texas Instruments, 
Citicorp and Thomas Cook. The industries there include Software Development, Business Process Outsourcing and 
Manufacturing. The tenant profile by country of origin, and by industry sector, is set out in Tables 3B and 3C 
respectively. 
 
4.  ANALYSES AND FINDINGS 
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Prior analyses on the Parks have relied primarily on secondary data from official publications, press reports, etc. To 
add empirical rigor to this paper, we applied the survey questionnaire developed in Yeoh, Perry and Lim (2000) 
through direct interviews with the tenants in BIP, VSIP and ITPL, to gauge the differential impact of various 
push/pull factors on firms’ decision to locate in the case-study parks, along with the differential impact of different 
types of constraints on their operations. The first set of questions sought to determine the profile of the respondents: 
type of ownership, nature of operations and size of establishment; and the second set was structured to gather 
information on the push/pull factors affecting the tenants. Other questions pertaining to the respondents’ views on 
the facilities and services in the Parks were culled from the open-ended questions. On-site interviews were 
undertaken in August 2002 (VSIP), December 2002 and June 2003 (ITPL) and July 2003 (BIP). This section 
presents our survey results.  
 
Profile of Respondents  
Of the 83 respondents, 27 were from BIP, 23 were from VSIP, and the remaining 33 were from ITPL16. Of the 27 
BIP respondents, 7 were wholly Singapore-owned, 11 were wholly Japan-owned, 5 were Singapore joint ventures 
with foreign countries and 4 were wholly foreign-owned. In terms of operations, 14 and 7 of the respondents 
manufactured intermediate products and consumer products respectively. The remaining 6 firms were engaged in 
industrial services. In terms of employment size, 12 firms hired between 101-500 employees and 14 hired beyond 
500 employees. In terms of sales for the annual year 2002, 9 had sales between US$10-50 million and 5 had sales 
beyond US$50 million.  
 
For VSIP, 6 respondents were wholly Singapore-owned, 1 was a joint-venture and 16 were wholly foreign-owned 
companies. There were 7 small firms, 8 medium-sized firms, and 8 large firms. As for the nature of operations, 8 
manufactured consumer products, 3 manufactured intermediate products, and 2 were involved in industrial services. 
None of the companies surveyed were manufacturers of capital goods. In terms of targeted markets, 9 targeted only 
the domestic (Vietnam) market, 4 targeted ASEAN countries, while 7 targeted both Vietnam and surrounding 
ASEAN countries. The remaining are export-based manufacturing entities catering to non-ASEAN countries.  
 
Of the 33 respondents in ITPL, 4 were wholly Singapore-owned, 2 were wholly Japan-owned, 21 were wholly 
foreign-owned and 2 were Singapore joint ventures. In terms of operation, 16 were engaged in software 
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development, 4 in support services, 2 in telecommunications and 2 in research and development. In terms of sales 
for the annual year 2002, 15 had sales less than US$ 5 million, 3 had sales between US$ 5–10 million and 2 had 
sales beyond US$ 10 million.  
 
Statistical Treatment of Survey Results 
Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and popular rankings on the responses related to factors and 
constraints, logit analysis was used to compare the push/pull factors influencing the tenants’ decision to locate in the 
Parks. The logit model, estimated by the maximum likelihood, takes the following form: 
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where:   F1 = 1 if ‘Political commitment from the Singapore government’ is selected, 0 otherwise  
       F2 = 1 if ‘Political commitment from the host country government’ is selected, 0 otherwise 
       F3 = 1 if ‘Investment incentives’ is selected, 0 otherwise 
       F4 = 1 if ‘Competitive labor costs’ is selected, 0 otherwise 
       F5 = 1 if ‘Reliable infrastructure facilities’ is selected, 0 otherwise 
       F6 = 1 if ‘Access to domestic market’ is selected, 0 otherwise 
       α0 = constant term 
                      αi = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
Estimated coefficients in the logit model, if statistically significant, would suggest that the firm choosing that 
particular push/pull factor is more likely to be from that particular park than other similar industrial parks. A similar 
logit model was applied to the constraints faced by the Parks’ tenants: 
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 where:    Pi is the probability of firm being located in the particular park, and                
       Zi is a linear function of the constraints defined as  
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where:  Ci (1 to n, depending on the type of constraint) = 1 if constraint i is selected, 0 otherwise  
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      β 0 = constant term 
                    β i = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
 
In this case, estimated coefficients in the logit model, if statistically significant, would suggest that the firm choosing 
that particular constraint is more likely to be from that particular park than other similar industrial parks. 
 
Factors influencing respondents’ decision to invest in the case-study parks17 (Tables 4A and 4B) 
Singapore leverages on its infrastructure development expertise and the low-cost labor available in the host 
environments to market its industrial parks. It supplements these purported advantages with its political commitment 
to the Parks, as demonstrated by the many bilateral agreements between the GLCs and host governments or 
politically-linked business conglomerates. Furthermore, there is a host of investment incentives that entice 
multinationals to locate their lower value-added activities in these self-contained enclaves.  
 
Not unexpectedly, the reliable and efficient Singapore-styled infrastructure was the Parks’ main draw, with 85%, 
70% and 82% of the BIP, VSIP and ITPL tenants surveyed citing it as a pull factor for them to locate in the Park 
respectively. Singapore appears to have succeeded in exporting its ‘expertise’ in infrastructure development and 
creating a location-advantage which is clearly in demand by companies in the South East Asian region. 
 
Political commitment from the Singapore and the Indonesian governments is a major concern for BIP tenants, as 
indicated by the positive and statistically significant α1 (=1.727) and α2 (=2.184) for BIP. This can be explained by 
the instability of Indonesia’s political system. The post-Soeharto era was significant for BIP, as many firms pulled 
out of BIP during the political unrest. The situation was further exacerbated by the political uncertainties with the 
Indonesian presidency changing hands, from Habibie, to the first elected president, Abdurrahman Wahid, and finally 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, on her predecessor’s impeachment. Key economic positions were reshuffled and economic 
advisors changed frequently, as power jockeying among the parties, ministries, legislature, central bank, and other 
institutions continued. All these serve to complicate investors’ assessment of Indonesia’s political outlook, making it 
imperative for both countries to signal their political commitment to the progress of the Park. Political commitment 
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from both the Singapore and Indonesian governments became particularly important in keeping the tenants’ 
confidence in BIP.  
 
On the other hand, political commitment from the Singapore government is not a concern for VSIP firms, with only 
3 respondents citing it as an affirmative pull factor. This observation suggests that companies which invest in 
Vietnam are more concerned with the operational conditions in VSIP, such as the reliable Singapore-styled 
infrastructure facilities, than with the Singapore government’s commitment to the success of the Park.  
 
Another pull factor for BIP is ‘competitive labor costs’, with 81% of the tenants indicating so, and as indicated by 
the positive and statistically significant α4 (=2.055). This is expected since BIP serves as a low-cost investment 
enclave, and a large proportion (81%) of the tenants in BIP engage in manufacturing activities. Manufacturing being 
labor intensive inherently requires much low-cost labor. The cheaper cost of labor is an added bonus to companies 
which locate in ITPL, but is not a deciding factor as indicated by the negative and highly significant α4 (=-3.620) for 
ITPL. 
 
Constraints Faced by Respondents' Operations (Tables 5A and 5B) 
BIP, VSIP and ITPL are now established industrial estate developments, but our study alludes to some emerging 
constraints which have undermined the attractiveness of the Parks. These constraints are categorized into three broad 
groups, namely, those relating to labor, those relating to organization and technology, and those relating to the 
economic ‘environment’, such as government policies and regulations. 
 
Labor-related constraints 
The ‘cheap’ labor resources which drew companies to Indonesia proved to be mere perception rather than a reality 
in BIP, as ‘rising labor costs’ is the main constraint faced by the majority (78%) of the BIP tenants surveyed. The 
logit coefficient, at β 3 (=3.433) is also positive and significant. Low labor productivity exacerbated the difficulties 
faced by the tenants, which perform predominantly labor-intensive activities in BIP. This is further documented by 
constant lamentations of industrial relations problems during our interviews with the tenants, and which are 
substantiated statistically by 63% of the BIP tenants and the positive and significant β 4 (=4.194). Many VSIP 
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tenants, on the other hand, did not face a problem of rising labor costs, as indicated by the negative and significant 
β3 (=-3.658). Instead, many VSIP tenants surveyed (74%) cited shortage of professionals and managers as a labor 
constraint, further substantiated by our logistic regression model where β2 (=2.462) is positive and significant. ITPL 
tenants, on the other hand, do not face such a problem, as indicated by the negative and significant β1 (=-1.538) and 
β2 (=-1.618). This could be explained by the fact that the city of Bangalore has excellent schools and universities, 
and serves as a continuous source of English-speaking, skilled talent for tenants in the park. 
 
Organizational and technological-related constraints 
The Singapore-styled infrastructure, though reliable and efficient, also proved to be costly, as facilities such as the 
power plant, waste-treatment system and water supply are independently managed. This resulted in high overhead 
costs, especially in BIP where 74% of respondents cited it as a constraint they faced, and to some extent less so in 
ITPL where the corresponding percentage is 48%. The positive and highly significant β5 (=2.497) for BIP supports 
our rankings analysis. Other organizational/technological constraints faced by BIP tenants (and less so by ITPL 
tenants) include difficulty in introducing new technology and techniques (β2 = 1.970 for BIP; β2 = -1.454 for ITPL) 
and the lack of good supporting services (β3 = 2.214 for BIP; β3 = -1.289 for ITPL). 
 
‘Environmental’ constraints 
‘Impact of host government regulations’ and ‘competition from overseas competitors’ are constraints faced by both 
BIP and VSIP tenants. However, whereas 89% and 78% of BIP tenants cited the above two constraints respectively, 
only about half of the VSIP tenants and less than a third of ITPL tenants indicated likewise. This accounts for the 
positive and significant β1 (=2.291) and β2 (=2.163) for BIP and the negative and significant β1 (=-1.353) and β2 (=-
2.137) for ITPL. The government’s control over the operating environment and the economic landscape shaped by 
overseas industry competitors has proven more stifling to the operations of the tenants in BIP than to those in VSIP 
and ITPL. 
 
To date, the Parks may have attracted a sizeable number of investments, but they have not met the expectations of 
the current tenants. While BIP may have been the most successful and profitable to date, only 52% of surveyed BIP 
tenants want to expand within the Park within the next 5 years, compared to 64% of tenants in ITPL, and 61% in 
VSIP. However, 41% of surveyed BIP tenants plan to retain the current size of operations within the next 5 years, 
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compared to 22% in VSIP and 27% in ITPL. In all three parks, insignificant proportions have plans to scale down 
operations or relocate from the parks. These statistics indicate a high degree of economic inertia amongst current 
tenants. A US-based precision electronics conglomerate with operations in BIP best sums up the general sentiments 
of the tenants: ‘moving to other locations would be cost-prohibitive, given the huge amount of costs the company 
has sunk into our BIP operations.’ 
 
5. ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
Our accompanying studies (Yeoh, et al, 2004b; Yeoh, et al, 2004c; Vaidyanath, et al, 2004), which featured in-depth 
case analyses of respondent firms, allude to problems with the host country’s ability to sustain the strategic fit 
between the value-added chain of the client firms, and the competitive advantages of the sites. Put differently, while 
the case-study parks do provide some components of competitive advantage which the host countries do not (e.g. 
reliable infrastructure), our earlier papers suggest that the strategic intent of these flagship projects have been 
stymied by non-economic, socio-political complexities in the larger host environment. To address this added 
dimension to our present research, we conducted further in-depth interviews with the Parks’ senior executives and 
tenants, to draw further empirical insights on the host environments in which the parks are located.  
 
To begin with, the special privileges secured by Singapore’s overseas industrial-park projects share a common trait: 
many of the privileges obtained were unprecedented, and unique, to the case study parks. For instance, the Parks 
were allowed to build and operate their own power and water treatment plants, and telecommunication facilities 
which, in all three sites, were an exclusive concession granted to the Singapore partners. As a result, the Parks enjoy 
the reputation of reliable infrastructural facilities in areas where these facilities are an anomaly. As well, the Parks’ 
management boards typically include local government officials, an arrangement which facilitates their privileged 
access to investment approvals, construction activities, import/export permits and immigration matters. Together, 
the Parks’ self-sufficient, self-contained environment presents investors with a formulaic one-stop service which 
filters out administrative uncertainties associated with emerging economies. One ITPL tenant cites the park’s 
‘excellent and professional support services and maintenance programs’ as a ‘tremendous advantage that gives us 
the added advantage over our counterparts that are located elsewhere.’ Significantly, Singapore’s positive reputation 
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with multinational corporations for its stable, corrupt-free investment environment lends credibility, such that 
locating within the Parks seems to ‘boost our company’s prestige’18. 
 
Influence can also be exerted through inter-governmental interaction and, where existing, through the links to 
influential ethnic business groups in the investment location who often rely on state patronage for their access to 
infrastructure development projects. The main Singapore partners involved in these projects were government-
linked companies (notably, SembCorp Industries, Keppel Corp and Ascendas International), and Temasek Holdings 
(the Singapore government’s main investment holding company). For BIP, the then main local partner was the 
Salim Group, which, albeit private, is nevertheless well known for its close links to senior Indonesian politicians and 
privileged access to major investment projects. In VSIP, the local partner, Becamax, is a state-owned enterprise. 
Working closely with the Singapore-led consortium, the local government expedited foreign investment approvals, 
and facilitated trade documentation and cargo clearance. ITPL similarly shares the characteristics of strong 
government involvement, with the Indian counterparts being the Karnataka state government, and the Tata Group, 
which, though private, is nonetheless well connected with local authorities. The strategic alliances between 
Singapore’s own state-owned enterprise networks, and its counterparts in the regional sites, were instrumental in 
mobilizing the financial resources to complete these multi-million projects and, in most cases, within a 
comparatively short time-frame of 18 to 24 months.  
 
Nonetheless, as most openly admitted, the strategically ‘engineered’, inter-government endorsement of the flagship 
projects, and the enormous resources mobilized through the strategic partnerships, have ‘failed’ to shield the Parks 
from a gamut of problems. Issues pertaining to the scale and character of development of BIP, inter alia, BIP’s 
resemblance to a Japanese investment enclave and vulnerability to a withdrawal of Japanese investments, and 
infrastructural dilemmas, as well as the limited impact of the Indonesia parks on the transfer of low value operations 
from Singapore, and the associated upgrading of linked activities in Singapore, are discussed in Grundy-Warr, et al 
(1999) and Yeoh, et al (2004d). Peachey et al (1998) have drawn attention to the influx of immigrants to the islands 
and, concomitantly, to the social problems of squatter settlements which threaten to overwhelm the investment value 
of the Indonesian parks.  
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A brief comparison with CSSIP further elucidates the gravity of the circumstances facing the three parks. Most 
notably, similar to the three case study parks, the collaboration for CSSIP to be a national economic development 
strategy was stymied by the indecisive reactions to the dynamic external environment, particularly the intense 
competition from Suzhou New District and the preferential treatment given to the latter by the provincial 
government. Even though the context for state collaboration for BIP, VSIP and ITPL is decidedly different from that 
for CSSIP, and the main problems confronting CSSIP as identified in Thomas (2001), Yeung (2002) and Pereira 
(2003) – differences in partners’ objectives and complex involvement of different levels of governments – are 
largely avoided, socio-political complexities of a different context continues to plague the three case-study parks.. 
The following observations update, and offer new insights, on BIP in Indonesia, and present data on recent 
developments in VSIP, Vietnam and ITPL, India. 
 
Heightened Competition 
Singapore’s overseas industrial parks are increasingly facing strong mounting competition from competing parks 
within their vicinity. Competitor parks, some of which are backed by prominent Indonesian politicians, have 
mushroomed around BIP. Panbil Industrial Park, for instance, is located directly opposite BIP, and offers similar 
factories at competitive rentals. The premium placed on the Park’s one-stop support service, and self-sufficient 
operating environment, is increasingly called into question. As well, competition is not limited to within Indonesia. 
Indonesia’s minimum wage, at US$43 to US$70 a month, depending on the region, prices it out of the global 
competition for cheap labor. Investors can get similarly-skilled labor from Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka at 
monthly wages of US$17, US$32, and US$40 respectively. Recent press reports on Riau’s investor exodus19 cite 
sluggish bureaucracy, ‘rowdy’ labor scenes, lack of legal certainty and security, and unclear investment policies as 
reasons for investors relocating their investments from Riau Province, and Indonesia. Populist measures such as 
raising the minimum wages before the general elections due in 2004, further heighten the reluctance of investors to 
pour money into the country. 
 
VSIP’s attractiveness has been eroded by competition from newer, albeit smaller, industrial parks developed by 
experienced and street-savvy developers from Korea, Taiwan and interestingly, Thailand. These competitor parks 
market themselves aggressively on price, charging significantly lower rentals for ‘no frills’ factory space. Not unlike 
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BIP, the economics of heightened competition have called into question the premium attached to the ‘superior 
infrastructure’ in low-cost industrial-investment enclaves like VSIP. As well, the Park was launched at the same 
time as Singapore’s other flagship projects in China. VSIP struggles to maintain investor interest, vis-à-vis other 
regional sites, notably Asia’s new powerhouses - China and India.  
 
ITPL’s success hinges on the ‘Singapore-styled design and management’ reputation. However, the premium placed 
on ITPL’s formulaic ‘one-stop’ service and self-sufficient infrastructure is similarly, and increasingly, eroded by 
intense competition from newer, albeit smaller, parks being developed by street-savvy Indian entrepreneurs, and 
ITPL’s capacity to provide stable electricity is the only differentiating factor from other IT parks like the Software 
Tech Park and Electronics City. These competitor paks market themselves aggressively on price. A case in point, 
ITPL’s listed lease price is Rs50 (approximately US$1) per square foot, whereas the rate in other areas, and within 
Electronic City itself, just outside ITPL, is less than Rs15. Our interviews with IPTL tenants have alluded to the 
possibility that the Park’s attractiveness may, in time, be eroded, as more IT parks and companies are established 
within the vicinity to capitalize on the area’s repute, while offering lower rentals with reliable energy, as the state 
develops. 
 
Political ‘Commitment’ 
Reliance on political patronage (and personal ties) rather than transparent contracts has brought about advantages 
and disadvantages. For BIP, the reliance on the Salim Group has been necessary in the context of the Indonesian 
system of ‘crony capitalism’ fostered by then President Soeharto. The end of the Soeharto era, and pressure from the 
IMF and western governments for financial transparency, has diminished Salim’s political and commercial influence. 
Ownership changes at BIP have brought about uncertainties20, as the Parks’ privileged access to senior politicians 
and policy-makers in Jakarta has proved more difficult. Compounding these uncertainties, inter-governmental 
endorsements, post-Soeharto, no longer suffice to secure commitments at the lower tiers of government. Anecdotal 
evidence21 points to a more complex regulatory environment for foreign companies, as they have to deal more 
intensively with the provincial and sub-provincial (district) governments. The Park’s reputation as an investment 
enclave has also not been left unscathed by political developments in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, the 
September 11 attacks in the United States, and more recently, the Bali and Jakarta-Marriot bomb blasts. In addition, 
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negative press reports on active terrorist cells within the region serve little to quell the innate risk-aversion of 
potential investors. BIP could do without these added sentiments in its larger environment. 
 
In VSIP, the ‘special’ support from the local authorities has proved to be less significant than initially thought. 
Improvements on infrastructural projects have translated into a plethora of miscellaneous fees, and added to 
operating costs. Corruption remains endemic. Our on-site interviews, conducted in August 2002, further point to 
negative undercurrents over Singapore’s control and management of VSIP. Anecdotal evidence suggests that, while 
there is an interest in learning from Singapore, tensions have arisen over Singapore-styled management practices, 
and these have translated into perception differences, protracted conflicts and project delays. Local sentiments 
towards the Singapore partners were not unlike those expressed in the Suzhou-Wuxi experience in China, albeit to a 
different degree. It is conceivable that the ownership-management structure of VSIP may, in time, be restructured to 
reflect a better alignment of interests. Significantly, SembCorp Industries has announced plans to divest itself of part 
of its stake in VSIP22, even as it is now registering positive returns on its investment. 
 
In India, varying degrees of commitment and support by different state governments towards the country’s 
development can affect ITPL’s competitive advantage. The lack of good supporting infrastructure in the surrounding 
environment, and the disparity in local state-government supporting different cities, serve as a deterrent to investors, 
even as cities like Hyderabad, Mumbai and Chennai continue to advance technologically. On a broader front, 
corruption remains endemic, and bureaucratic red-tape is difficult to circumvent. These considerations are, by 
themselves, deterrence to potential investors, even with Singapore’s presence and involvement. To hedge 
Singapore’s strategic interests in India, Ascendas is reportedly partnering India’s largest construction conglomerate, 
Larsen and Toubro, to build Cyber Pearl in Hyderabad’s Hitec City, while plans are in place to develop similar IT 
parks in Chennai and other Indian cities, on a turnkey basis. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Singapore’s overseas parks tend to exist as investment enclaves within a disjointed economic and policy 
environment. They are linked to transnational investment networks, business elites and specific government 
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commitments. The positive aspect of this is that the parks can be sites of investment privilege, in respect of their 
regulatory controls, infrastructure quality and status with public and private agencies. The weakness is that the 
privileges obtained are vulnerable to changes in political allegiances, and the infrastructure efficiency is at risk from 
the uncontrolled broader environment in which the park is located.  
 
An outright assessment of failure or success may not be appropriate, given the mixed economic and political 
objectives. Official commitment to the projects remains, in the willingness of the Parks’ management to cut 
alternative strategies to re-position these flagship projects. In our discussions, the Parks’ management reasons that 
competition is inevitable. And, rather than engaging in a price war, management has indicated a preference to adjust 
rates to ‘better reflect market situations’ while, at the same time, endeavor to differentiate the Parks from 
competitors by catering to higher value-added activities. For instance, in BIP, there are plans to create new 
initiatives for the Parks’ tenants, such as offering broadband services ahead of competitors, and providing supply-
chain management solutions for its tenants. Interestingly, the Parks’ managements view competitors as essential 
components of a ‘living system in which all entities within the system constantly adapt to their dynamic 
environment and are synergistically integrated’. In the case of BIP, it is argued, co-existence must be established to 
augment a positive image of the Riau Islands as an investment haven, and competitors are viewed as an imperative 
to the long-term attractiveness of BIP. As well, Bintan Industrial Estate, in close geographical proximity to BIP, 
serves as a cheaper alternative for cost-conscious companies to locate their operational activities. In the case of 
VSIP and ITPL, the projects are perceived as strategic thrusts to capitalize upon first-mover advantages in regional 
economies with immense market potential.  As well, VSIP and ITPL, as the first entrants to successfully develop 
and manage state-of-the-art industrial parks in the host economies, have arguably enhanced Singapore’s reputation 
for industrial-township and/or infrastructural projects. More subtly, it has propositioned that the ‘apparent success’ 
of these strategic initiatives may leverage Singaporean companies’ foray into the host countries’ aggressive 
infrastructure plans and commercial-residential township projects. This may well be the case, with exciting 
possibilities for further research. 
 
However, our immediate study suggests the economic theorization that underscores Singapore’s trans-border 
industrialization stratagem continues to be overshadowed by the policy nuances that radiate from the host 
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environments. The calculated, schematized efforts at trans-border industrialization, though remarkable, have been 
overly optimistic and have failed to engender equally compelling results, more often than not frustrated by the 
intricacies of socio-political realities in the host economies. The limits to ‘Singapore Unlimited’ have been exposed 
in this paper. 
                                                 
1 This research is funded by the Wharton-SMU Research Center, Singapore Management University. The authors would also like to express 
sincere thanks to the journal reviewers whose comments added substantially to the final presentation of this work.  
 
2 Stoever (1985), Dunning (1988) and Porter (1990), among others, illustrate that a country’s relative level and composition of outward and 
inward investments are systematically related to its stage of development. Dunning’s (1988) investment development path model suggests that 
countries advance through five stages of development which relate to different levels of net outward investment. The thesis suggests that 
countries in the more advanced stages of development will have to increase their outward FDI in order to achieve greater economic growth. An 
extension of this thesis is revisited in Dunning and Narula (1996). 
 
3 The main ideas were set out in the policy document, Gearing Up for an Enhanced Role in the Global Economy (Singapore Economic Development 
Board (SEDB), 1988). The 1990 Global Strategies Conference added new dimensions to these deliberations (SEDB, 1990). 
 
4 The principles of government involvement are rationalized in the 1993 Report of the Committee to Promote Enterprise Overseas (chapter 4). 
For a scholarly discussion on the political economy of Singapore’s development strategy, see Rodan (1989); Regnier (1991); Huff (1995); Low 
(1998) and Blomqvist (2001). There is also an extensive political-economy literature on Singapore’s regionalization program, succinctly 
summarized in Bellows (1995) and Yeung (1998). 
 
5 The stress on exploiting personal ties accords with business practice preferred by the linked communities of ‘overseas Chinese’ (Redding, 1990, 
Yeung, 1997; Brown, 1998; Lehman, 1998), the ‘bamboo network’ which Singapore made use of in its industrial parks in Indonesia and China. 
Personal ties between Chairman, SEDB, and Ratan Tata (of the Tata Group) reportedly facilitated the move into India (Asian Review, 1996). 
 
6 Shakkei’ is a Japanese landscaping strategy, where the scenery from one’s garden is enhanced by incorporating the scenery from afar, such that 
the combined scenery is superior to each on its own. Extrapolated, the collective competitiveness approach envisaged that the development of 
regional economies, and sites, leads to positive complementary growth for Singapore. 
 
7 This is now an extensive literature on the problems encountered in the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park project (e.g. Cartier, 1995; Law, 
1996; Dolven, 1999; Perry and Yeoh, 2000; Thomas, 2001); various news reports, for example, The Economist (January 3, 1998), The Straits 
Times (December 5, 1997; May 14, 1999; June 30, 1999); and an unpublished (confidential) report commissioned by the Singapore Government.  
 
8 The cataclysmic collapse of oil prices in the early 1980s impressed upon Indonesia's economic planners the need for a more broad-based 
development strategy. The Riau islands were an obvious choice to encourage investments not least because Singapore has shown interest in leasing 
these nearby islands to transcend the city-state's need for inexpensive land and labor. By the late 1980s, the perception from Jakarta was that 
Singapore was ‘bursting at the seams’, and that the time was right to position Batam and the other Riau islands to take advantage of the spill-over 
from Singapore. 
 
9  The Singapore consortium was led by Singapore Technologies Industrial Corporation (now SembCorp Industries) and Jurong Town 
Corporation, Singapore’s main industrial estate infrastructure developer. 
 
10 The Board, with representatives from the ministries of Trade, Finance and Interior, as well as the General Customs Department oversees the 
issue of investment licenses, import/export permits, and construction permits.  
 
11  Other members of the consortium include Temasek Holdings, JTC International, UOL Overseas Investments, Salim’s KMP Vietnam 
Investment, LKN Construction, Sembawang Engineering and Mitsubishi Corporation.  
 
12 Details are given in Circular No. 8, List of Encouraged, Limited and Prohibited Industries in Export Processing Zones and High-Technology 
Industrial Zones, issued on July 29, 1997. 
 
13 Indian universities reportedly graduate about 20,000 to 30,000 software engineers every year, and Bangalore has been a ‘hunting ground’ for 
Singapore companies and Singapore-based multinationals seeking low-cost IT specialists. 
 
14 The Singapore consortium, Information Technology Park Investments Pte Ltd,  includes RSP Architects, Planners and Engineers, L&M 
Properties, Sembawang Industrial, Technology Parks (a Jurong Town Corporation subsidiary) and Parameswara Holdings (the investment arm of 
the Singapore Indian Chamber of Commerce). 
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15 The Straits Times, August 8, 1999 
 
16 Population size of firms in each park is the number of operating tenants at the time of survey of each park - 78 for BIP, 64 for VSIP, and 90 for 
ITPL. Sample size is thus sufficiently large and the logit model is sufficiently robust and reliable. 
 
17 ‘Respondents’ decisions to invest’ refer to past investment decisions, made at the time the park was built and/or marketed to the tenants, so as 
to reveal the effectiveness of Singapore’s initial efforts at building a ‘second wing’. 
 
18 This was a constant refrain throughout our interviews in ITPL. 
 
19 The Straits Times, August 30, 2003; The Straits Times, December 5, 2003. 
 
20 The Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency has reportedly offered to sell the Salim Group’s stakes in all the Riau projects – estimated to be 
worth S$500 million – in a packaged deal (The Business Times, August 28, 2001). Further restructuring have taken place, with the three main 
stakeholders now being SCI, Ascendas and the Indonesian government. 
 
21 Law No. 22/199 allows provincial, district and municipal governments to write provincial laws, some of which contradict national laws, or test 
the boundaries of their power. The Megawati administration is now proposing a revision of laws on regional autonomy, but the direction remains 
unclear. For a discussion on the problems with regional autonomy and their impact on business, see van Zorge, Heffernan & Associates (April 
2002). Interviews with BIP executives and tenants in  2003 have also alluded to this changed operating environment. 
 
22 The Straits Times, December 3, 2003. 
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                      Table 1A Batamindo Industrial Park - operational statistics (June 2003) 
                              
General Information 
 
Investment by Developer 
Committed Tenants 
Area Taken Up 
Investment by Tenants 
Annual Export Value (for 2002) 
    No. of Employees 
 
US$470 million 
82 
320 hectares 
> US$1 billion 
> US$2 billion 
65,000 
 
 
                              Source: SembCorp Industries. 
 
 
 
 
                          Table 1B Batamindo Industrial Park – tenant profile by country of origin (June 2003) 
 
Country Percent 
USA 9 
Japan 48 
Europe 11 
Singapore 30 
 
            Source: Batamindo Industrial Park, Tenants’ List, June 2003. 
                               
 
 
 
            Table 1C Batamindo Industrial Park – tenant profile by sector (June 2003) 
 
Sector Percent Sector Percent 
Electronics 44 Packaging  6 
Precision Parts 15 Medical 4 
Plastic molding 10 Pharmaceuticals 1 
Electrical 11 Others 9 
 
  Source: Batamindo Industrial Park, Tenants’ List, June 2003 
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Table 2A Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park - operational statistics (September 2003) 
                              
General Information 
 
Investment by Developer 
Committed Tenants 
Area Taken Up 
Investment by Tenants 
Annual Export Value (for 2002) 
    No. of Employees 
 
US$600 million 
124  
300 hectares 
> US$1 billion 
> US$2 billion 
24,000 
 
 
                             Source: SembCorp Parks Management. 
 
 
 
 
                          Table 2B Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park – tenant profile by country of origin (September 2003) 
 
Country Percent 
Singapore 24 
Japan 21 
Taiwan 17 
Other Asian Countries 22 
US and Europe 16 
 
            Source: SembCorp Parks Management. 
                               
 
   
Table 2C Vietnam-Singapore Industrial Park – tenant profile by sector (September 2003) 
 
Sector Percent Sector Percent 
Electronics 11 Consumer goods 14 
Food 9 Logistics 14 
Light industries 20 Parts and components 10 
Pharmaceuticals 9 Others 13 
 
  Source: SembCorp Parks Management. 
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Table 3A International Technology Park Limited - operational statistics (June 2003) 
 
General Information 
Scale of Development  
Developed Area 
Total Investment Value 
Confirmed Tenants 
Operating Tenants 
Area Taken Up 
Park Population 
 
About 70 acres 
1.6 million sq ft 
SG$200 Million 
100 
 93 
1.4 million sq ft. 
8,500 
 
 
Source: Ascendas International.     
 
 
 
                          Table 3B International Technology Park Limited – tenant profile by country of origin (June 2003) 
 
Country Percent 
USA 42 
India 36 
Europe 16 
Asia 6 
 
        Source: Ascendas International.     
  
 
 
           Table 3C International Technology Park Limited – tenant profile by sector (June 2003) 
 
Sector Percent Sector Percent 
Software Development 49 IC Design 3 
BPO/ITES 24 R&D 1 
Biotech/Bio-Informatics 3 Educational Institutions 2 
Manufacturing 10 Others 8 
                                                                
Source: Ascendas International.   
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Table 4A Factors influencing respondents’ decisions to invest in BIP, VSIP and ITPL (by popular ranking) 
 
Variables BIP VSIP ITPL 
       
 Frequency Rank Frequency Rank Frequency Rank 
       
Political commitment from the Singapore government 17 4 3 6 6 4 
       
Political commitment from the host country government 21 3 7 4 6 4 
       
Investment incentives 16 5 12 2 14 2 
       
Competitive labor costs 22 2 11 3 1 6 
       
Reliable infrastructure facilities 23 1 16 1 27 1 
       
Availability of skilled/educated labor 16 5 6 5 12 3 
       
 
 
Source: Questionnaire surveys. 
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Table 4B Factors influencing respondents’ decisions to invest in BIP, VSIP and ITPL 
(by maximum likelihood estimates - binary logits)ψ, φ 
 
Variables BIP VSIP ITPL 
    
Political commitment from the Singapore government 1.727 -1.602 -0.188 
 (0.034)** (0.031)** (0.821) 
Political commitment from the host country government 2.184 -0.706 -1.048 
 (0.005)*** (0.251) (0.126) 
Investment incentives 0.929 -0.095 -0.398 
 (0.265) (0.877) (0.558) 
Competitive labor costs 2.055 0.882 -3.620 
 (0.007)*** (0.147) (0.001)*** 
Reliable infrastructure facilities -0.077 -0.309 0.704 
 (0.935) (0.641) (0.357) 
Availability of skilled/educated labor 0.865 0.720 -0.091 
 (0.281) (0.233) (0.896) 
Constant (α0) -3.252 2.413 4.178 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** 
 
Note: ψ Estimated values were taken from ‘forced entry’ regression. 
          φ Values in parentheses are p-values for 2-tailed tests. 
      *** Significant at 1% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level 
          * Significant at 10% level 
      n.c. Non-convergence 
 
Source: Questionnaire surveys. 
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Table 5A Major constraints on respondents’ operations in BIP, VSIP and ITPL (by popular ranking) 
 
Variables BIP VSIP ITPL 
       
 Frequency Rank Frequency Rank Frequency Rank 
       
Labor constraints       
       
Shortage of semi-skilled and skilled labor 11 3 12 2 3 4 
       
Shortage of professionals and managers 10 4 17 1 4 3 
       
Rising labor costs 21 1 1 4 7 1 
       
Industrial relations problems 17 2 0 5 3 4 
       
Others 4 5 4 3 7 1 
       
       
Organizational and Technological constraints       
       
Difficulty in obtaining capital equipment 5 4 6 1 3 4 
       
Difficulty in introducing new technology and techniques 11 3 5 2 3 4 
       
Lack of good supporting services 13 2 5 2 4 2 
       
Difficulty in securing funds for expansion 4 5 2 6 2 6 
       
High and/or rising overhead costs 20 1 5 2 16 1 
       
Others 0 6 5 2 4 2 
       
       
Environmental constraints       
       
Impact of host government regulations 24 1 11 1 8 1 
       
Competition from overseas industry competitors 21 2 11 1 4 3 
       
Others 1 3 7 3 6 2 
       
 
Source: Questionnaire surveys. 
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Table 5B Major constraints on respondents’ operations in BIP, VSIP and ITPL 
 (by maximum likelihood estimates - binary logits)ψ, φ 
 
 
Note: ψ Estimated values were taken from ‘forced entry’ regression. 
          φ Values in parentheses are p-values for 2-tailed tests. 
     *** Significant at 1% level 
       ** Significant at 5% level 
         * Significant at 10% level 
    n.c. Non-convergence 
Source: Questionnaire surveys. 
Variables BIP VSIP ITPL 
    
Labor constraints    
    
Shortage of semi-skilled and skilled labor 2.975 -0.119 -1.538 
 (0.023)** (0.902) (0.055)* 
Shortage of professionals and managers -0.991 2.462 -1.618 
 (0.330) (0.005)*** (0.021)** 
Rising labor costs 3.433 -3.658 -0.353 
 (0.001)*** (0.003)*** (0.606) 
Industrial relations problems 4.194 n.c. -1.817 
 (0.001)*** n.c. (0.022)** 
Others 1.907 -0.673 -0.235 
 (0.168) (0.485) (0.753) 
Constant (β 0) -7.174 n.c. 4.758 
 (0.003)*** n.c. (0.001)*** 
    
Organizational and Technological constraints    
    
Difficulty in obtaining capital equipment 0.617 0.925 -1.081 
 (0.441) (0.242) (0.170) 
Difficulty in introducing new technology and techniques 1.970 -0.293 -1.454 
 (0.011)** (0.693) (0.049)** 
Lack of good supporting services 2.214 -0.874 -1.289 
 (0.004)*** (0.247) (0.057)* 
Difficulty in securing funds for expansion 1.638 -1.013 -0.672 
 (0.088)* (0.369) (0.479) 
High and/or rising overhead costs 2.497 -2.466 0.533 
 (0.003)*** (0.001)*** (0.382) 
Others n.c. -0.192 -0.297 
 n.c. (0.840) (0.736) 
Constant (β 0) n.c. 3.272 4.246 
 n.c. (0.126) (0.024)** 
    
Environmental constraints    
    
Impact of host government regulations 2.291 -0.485 -1.353 
 (0.003)*** (0.378) (0.030)** 
Competition from overseas industry competitors 2.163 0.104 -2.137 
 (0.001)*** (0.848) (0.001)*** 
Others -1.856 0.846 -0.360 
 (0.129) (0.192) (0.632) 
Constant (β 0) 0.577 0.273 2.989 
 (0.630) (0.709) (0.003)*** 
